«داعش» يعزز وجوده في منطقة الساحل الأفريقي

The terrorist organization ISIS claimed the first suicide attack using an improvised explosive device in Mali since 2020, as it continues to develop its various capabilities and enhance its capabilities in the Sahel region.
The ISIS terrorist organization launched a major attack through a complex ambush on June 13, 2024, which included a car bomb that targeted a joint convoy of the African army and the Malian army along the R20 road linking the cities of Menaka and Ansongo in northeastern Mali.
ISIS claimed to have attacked the convoy several times, killing and wounding 30 soldiers. This attack is the first ISIS car bomb attack since at least 2022, when the Malian army claimed that ISIS used a car bomb in an attack on a Malian army base southeast of Ansongo.
ISIS-Mali has also consolidated its territorial control in Mali over the past two years, facilitating its growing military capabilities.
The United Nations noted that the territory under ISIS control doubled between 2022 and the first half of 2023, including swaths of northeastern Mali previously controlled by its al-Qaeda-linked rivals and sectarian militias.
ISIS also achieved this growth through a military offensive in 2022 and 2023 after the French withdrawal that targeted the Group to Support Islam and Muslims and ethnic groups that historically supported French forces and the Group to Support Islam against ISIS.
The group slaughtered hundreds of civilians in revenge killings against French suspects and collaborators with the group to support Islam and Muslims.
Since then, ISIS in Burkina Faso has imposed various governance measures in rural areas under its control and has besieged a regional capital, Menaka, since April 2023.
The group brought back local residents who had fled several villages now under its control and rebuilt damaged homes and water towers. It also began regulating the use of water towers, reopening weekly markets, funding health services, and providing security patrols around cities and for traders traveling to nearby markets.
The siege of Menaka enabled it to tax local economic activity inside and outside the city. The group has also carried out numerous Sharia punishments throughout the Gao and Minaka regions since June 2023.
At the same time, ISIS has increased its military and government efforts across the border in Niger since the July 2023 coup. The group has dramatically increased the lethality of its attacks, with the number of deaths averaging about five times as much per month since July 2023.
In October 2023, the group carried out an ambush similar to the June 13 attack; this attack reportedly involved multiple car bombs and killed dozens of Nigerien soldiers. At the same time, ISIS expanded the geographic reach and scale of its tax activities in northern Niger. Security forces had previously reduced pressure on ISIS after large-scale deadly and demoralizing attacks, allowing the group to consolidate and expand its areas of support.
Subsequently, some Nigerian soldiers stationed near the Malian border stopped patrols and remained at their bases after the attack in Niger. The frequent use of IEDs in ambushes indicates that the group is trying to prevent security forces from reaching targeted areas.
ISIS West Africa Province uses similar tactics to repel security force patrols. The lack of Western intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support since the French withdrawal from Mali in 2021 and the coup in Niger in 2023 has contributed to ISIS-Sabha’s ability to launch these large-scale attacks in both countries.
ISIS has historically used IEDs in large-scale attacks that have overrun hardline security force bases near vital towns, highlighting the risks to Menaka.
ISIS also recently overran Malian forces in Tissit, Gao region, in August 2022 in a complex attack involving ground troops, mortars, drones, and a car bomb. The militants then terrorized the local population before withdrawing.
ISIS took control of the surrounding area and isolated Malian forces in the following months, and claimed to have implemented its Sharia punishments in the town in August 2023. The organization’s recent suicide operations and its management activity indicate that it has developed the military and administrative capabilities it needs to implement this strategy in Minaka.
The growing strength of ISIS in Borno State and its territorial control have attracted foreign fighters from North Africa and Europe since early 2023, increasing the risk of the group’s transnational threat.
The United Nations Security Council stated in August 2023 that ISIS recruits and facilitators had established transit corridors between southern Europe and the Sahel region. Moroccan security forces have since disrupted three ISIS cells facilitating foreign fighter travel to Mali State, in October 2023 and January-February 2024.
The presence of foreign fighters has previously led to an increase in foreign attack plots by Salafist-jihadi groups. Foreign fighters are among the most hardline ideologues who belong to the transnational Salafist-jihadi movement and are unconcerned with the local goals or grievances that motivate local militants.
Many foreign fighters have also shown interest in returning to their home countries to organize attack plots after becoming more radicalized in the theater of an active conflict.
ISIS’s northwest Africa province has already shown interest in organizing outside activity, given that the UN Security Council reported that it organized a now-defunct attack cell operating out of Morocco and Spain.
Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahideen Movement and the future of the African Union in Somalia
The African Union has backed plans to establish a new African Union-led peacekeeping mission in Somalia after the end of the African Union transitional mission in Somalia at the end of 2024.
The African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) endorsed the plans on June 20 in a statement that said it “noted concern” that ongoing counter-terrorism offensives and the simultaneous withdrawal of international forces at the end of 2024 would leave gaps that could be exploited by Al-Shabaab.
The African Peace and Security Council also stressed the “importance” of force formation, renewal, integration and capacity building as essential criteria for Somalia to fully assume security responsibility.
The African Union’s justification for the mission echoed numerous warnings about al-Shabaab’s growing strength in 2024. Anonymous U.S. defense officials told Voice of America in June that al-Shabaab in 2024 had “reversed all” of the gains the Somali federal government had made in central Somalia since its offensive stalled in 2022.
The Somali National Security Adviser strongly rejected this claim. The Counter-Terrorism Organization warned of noticeable gains by Al-Shabaab in vital areas in central Somalia throughout 2024.
The Somali Socialist Group and independent observers also indicated that a complete withdrawal of the African Union military presence at the end of 2024 would be premature.
The African Union and the Somali government published a joint assessment last March that recommended adjusting the withdrawal timetable “based on the actual readiness and capabilities” of Somali forces, and that “a precipitous withdrawal of African troops would contribute to a security vacuum.”
In May, the group called on the African Union to slow and modify the planned withdrawal of the current ATMIS mission. Paul D. Williams, director of the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, also published an assessment of the SNA versus al-Shabaab in the May edition of the West Point Combating Terrorism Center, saying that al-Shabaab would currently be slightly stronger militarily than the SNA in the event of a complete AU withdrawal “because of its significant advantages across the non-material dimensions of force employment, cohesion, psychological operations, and force sustainability.”
The new mission’s initial objectives are similar to ATMIS, but the AU has toned down the language on capacity building and statehood and positioned itself as an equal partner to the SFG. Initial information about the future AU-led mission does not indicate any major military change from ATMIS. Many of the new mission’s security objectives carry over directly from the ATMIS mandate, such as degrading al-Shabaab, providing security for civilians, and supporting stabilization efforts.
The June 20 statement indicated that the mission would de-emphasize leadership capabilities and state-building and instead focus on stabilization activities in cooperation with the SFG.
The AUPSC stressed the need to establish clear lines of communication, centralized joint planning processes, command structures, and information-sharing mechanisms with the SFG. The AU also positioned stabilization efforts as a means to “enable” state-building priorities and transfer security responsibilities.
This differs from the frameworks of ATMIS and AMISOM, which directly tasked the mission with developing security and governance capacities.
This framing indicates that the African Union aims to reduce the mission’s responsibilities and calm pro-sovereignty sentiment in Somalia. International donors are seeking to scale back the mission due to lack of funding.
The current SFG administration has repeatedly said it will take charge of its security on the back of counterterrorism successes in 2022 and 2023 before recent setbacks in 2024. These trends make all stakeholders interested in reducing the scope and objectives of any new mission.
The Somali government also exacerbated pro-sovereignty sentiments and specifically anti-Ethiopia sentiments through aggressive rhetoric against Ethiopia in 2024 over a diplomatic dispute.
Al-Shabaab has historically played on this sentiment to criticize AMISOM as an “occupying” force propping up an “illegitimate” government, creating a potential backlash against the continuation of the AMISOM mission.
The shifting priorities of Somalia’s regional and international partners make it uncertain which countries will contribute troops and fund the mission. Ethiopia’s role in the new mission remains unclear and controversial due to its ongoing diplomatic dispute with the Somali government.
Somalia’s National Security Adviser Hussein Sheikh Ali said Somalia would expel Ethiopian troops when the ATMIS mandate expires, at the end of 2024, unless Ethiopia scrapped a port deal it signed with the de facto breakaway region of Somaliland and that the Somali government would invite the other four ATMIS countries to stay in the country under a post-ATMIS framework.
Security analysts have previously estimated that Ethiopia will almost certainly maintain its presence in Somalia as it uses its forces to create a buffer zone against al-Shabaab, which it considers essential to its national security. Ethiopia currently has more than 4,000 troops in Somalia as part of ATMIS, and thousands more in the country on a bilateral basis.
Ethiopia also indicated it would remain in Somalia when it sent thousands of additional troops across the border into Somalia on June 22, 2024, warning local and military leaders that they would return if al-Shabaab fighters were found in the area.
Partner nations and Somali armed forces will almost certainly not be able to make up the force gap of 10,000 or more troops if Ethiopia withdraws, and will also lack communications in the area that Ethiopian forces have reinforced.
Western partners are also disputing over funding for the new mission. The European Union and the United States, the largest funders of AU missions since they began in 2007, have sought to scale back the peacekeeping operation due to concerns about long-term financing and sustainability.
Western officials specifically express concerns about “unnecessary costs” and lax regulations regarding troop presence. The European Union wants the new mission to be funded through the United Nations. In its June statement, the African Peace and Security Council acknowledged the “steadfast support” of the European Union, but noted that the African Union Commission would need to continue developing additional funding options for the new mission.
ISIS achieved this growth through a military offensive in 2022 and 2023
Shabab al-Mujahideen in Somalia is witnessing tangible progress as the withdrawal of African forces from the country approaches

Finally; The security challenges resulting from the expansion of ISIS in the African Sahel countries pose a serious threat not only to the region itself, but its repercussions extend to affect security in Europe.
This expansion enhances the organization’s capabilities to recruit, finance, and carry out terrorist operations, threatening to increase terrorist attacks on European soil.
The threat extends to the movement of returning fighters, the spread of extremist ideas, and the increase in refugees fleeing conflict.
All these factors require intensive international cooperation between the Sahel countries and Europe, and the implementation of comprehensive and sustainable security strategies to address this growing threat and maintain stability and security in both regions. The threats posed by the Somali Al-Shabaab movement to regional security also pose a major challenge, as its violent and ongoing activities destabilize the Horn of Africa.
These threats extend to navigation and supply chains, as the movement seeks to control coastal areas, endangering international navigation and threatening to cut off vital trade routes.
The Somali Al-Shabaab movement may pose an indirect threat to Egypt by strengthening terrorist networks in the region and increasing the flow of weapons and fighters across the border. Egypt and neighboring countries need vigilance and joint security cooperation to confront this potential threat and maintain regional security and stability.
Addressing the challenges of Al-Shabaab requires coordinated international efforts, and enhancing the security and development capacities of affected countries, to ensure the protection of sea lanes and vital supply chains at the regional and international levels.